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Abstract
We study a mechanism design model with flexible but costly information acquisition.
There is a principal and I ≥ 4 agents. The principal and the agents share a common prior
over the set of payoff-relevant states of the world. The principal proposes a mechanism
to the agents who can then acquire information about the state of the world by privately
designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that
is pairwise independent from the state of the world, we show that there exists a mecha-
nism which allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information
acquisition cost to the agents.
1 Introduction
In most mechanism design problems, there is a collection of agents who have exogenously
given private information, and there is a principal who desires to implement a social choice rule,
by designing a mechanism which incentivizes the agents to reveal their information.
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In many problems in practice, however, the agents’ private information is often a consequence
of their own (possibly costly) information acquisition. For example, bidders in an oil-tract
auction (Wilson, 1969) may conduct test drills; bidders in a spectrum auction may conduct
market research; voters in a presidential election may investigate the candidates’ past political
activities; members of a hiring committee may study the job applicant’s background in order
to see whether he is fit for the job.
Importantly, in such situations, a mechanism in place does not only affect each agent’s
incentive of reporting the acquired information truthfully, but also affects his choice of what
kind of information to acquire. In this sense, the properties of desirable mechanisms could
potentially be very different from those which only guarantee truth-telling incentives for a given
information structure.
Although this issue is already relevant in single-agent environments,1 the degree of com-
plexity is even higher in a multi-agent environment: in principle, flexibility of each agent’s
information acquisition action does not only mean flexibility in terms of his signal’s informa-
tiveness about the payoff-relevant state (e.g., the amount of oil in a tract), but also means
flexibility in terms of his opponents’ signals. This issue of higher-order information / beliefs is
unique in multi-agent environments.2 As far as we understand, when it comes to higher-order
information, there is no obvious or universally agreed upon class of information acquisition cost
functions.3 Hence, in this paper, we take an agnostic approach by essentially assuming that an
agent’s information cost only depends on its informativeness about the payoff-relevant state,
but not on the others’ signals. We believe that it is a reasonable “first-step” assumption, but
we must admit that our result crucially depends on this assumption. We discuss it in Section
5.1.
We consider a model with four or more agents, and assume that it is costless for each agent
to acquire a signal that is pairwise independent from the state of the world.4 The principal and
1Mensch (2020) studies a mechanism design problem with a single agent. See also Section 1.1.
2Of course, this issue can be avoided if we impose some ad hoc assumptions such as conditional independence,
although that is not the scope of the paper.
3See Section 1.1 and 5.1.
4The literature on cost of information proposes and discusses a variety of possible cost functions (see Section
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agents share a common prior, and none of them has any private information at the beginning.
We show that there exists a mechanism which allows the principal to implement any social choice
rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents. The mechanism recommends each agent
to choose a special information acquisition action, which satisfies the individually-uninformative-
but-aggregately-revealing property of Zhu (2021) (and each agent finds it optimal to obey this
recommended action). The individually-uninformative part means that each agent’s signal
on its own is pairwise independent from the payoff-relevant state, which guarantees that his
information cost is zero. The aggregately-revealing part means that the principal, by observing
all the agents’ reports — in fact, any two of them, — can correctly identify the true payoff-
relevant state. The fact that only two is enough, together with the fact that there are four or
more agents, enables the principal to detect any unilateral deviation. It establishes the incentive
compatibility of the mechanism.
1.1 Related Literature
In the literature of information acquisition in mechanism design, we usually consider re-
stricted / less flexible spaces of information (see, for example, Bergemann and Välimäki (2002)
for efficient mechanism design, Shi (2012) and Bikhchandani and Obara (2017) for optimal auc-
tion design, and Persico (2004), Gerardi and Yariv (2008), Gershkov and Szentes (2009), and
Zhao (2016) for committee design with information acquisition.5)
Mensch (2020) studies mechanism design with a single agent’s flexible and costly information
acquisition, building on the rational inattention framework (Sims (2003))6. Flexible information
acquisition is also considered by Roesler and Szentes (2017) in the context of buyer-optimal
1.1), but it seems to be universally accepted that uninformative signals about the state of the world are costless.
5Restricting to the class of conservative rules, Li (2001) solves for the optimal degree of conservatism in
committee design. The optimally chosen conservative rule outperforms the ex post optimal rule.
6Mensch (2020) also considers a multiple-agent extension of his model, but restricts attention to symmetric
mechanisms in an independent private values setting, in which agents can acquire information about their own
values, but cannot acquire any information about others’ values.
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information in monopoly pricing,7 by Bergemann et al. (2017) and Brooks and Du (2021) in
the context of seller-pessimal information in common-value auction, and by Yamashita (2018)
in private-value auction. All these papers have a common feature that there is a single entity,
“nature”, who chooses the information structure (of one or multiple agents). In contrast, in
our model, each of multiple agents acquires information in a decentralized manner, leading to
a very different conclusion.
The information structure we employ was proposed in the context of mechanism design by
Zhu (2021), who studies information disclosure by a mechanism designer. It builds on the idea
of the one-time pad, unbreakable encryption (Shannon, 1949).8
This key information structure makes the agents’ acquired information statistically depen-
dent. In quasi-linear environments, Crémer and McLean (1988) show that the principal can
extract full surplus from the agents. Although the extreme positivity of the results is a common
feature of our paper and theirs, the two problems are quite different. First, our paper does
not assume quasi-linearity. Second, their side-bet mechanism exploits an exogenously given
correlated signal structure, and it is not clear if it can be induced as an equilibrium information
structure given some reasonable spaces of information acquisition actions.9 In our case, the
above mentioned information structure is indeed an equilibrium outcome, even though each
agent can potentially acquire information independent from the others’ signals.
In non-quasi-linear environments, such as collective decision-making in committees, the first
best outcome is generally not implementable under the commonly imposed restrictions on infor-
mation acquisition technologies. For example, Li (2001) and Persico (2004), assuming that the
agents have access to conditionally independent signals, show that the first best outcome is not
7See also Condorelli and Szentes (2020), though they also consider non-information changes of the agent’s
private information distribution.
8See also Kalai et al. (2010); Renou and Tomala (2012); Renault et al. (2014), in the context of games of
communication network. Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013) apply this idea in mechanism-design games with
multiple principals, and Liu (2015) applies it in his concept of individually uninformative correlating device.
Our construction is most directly related to Zhu (2021).
9Bikhchandani (2010) shows that, indeed, an agent in the Crémer-McLean mechanism may have a strong
incentive of acquiring information about others.
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attainable. In contrast to the previous results, we show that correlated information acquisition
resolves the free-riding issue in collective decision-making in committees, which, in turn, helps
to implement the first best outcome.
There is a growing literature on the cost of flexible information in decision environments.
See for example Sims (2003), Matejka and Mckay (2015), Caplin and Dean (2015), and Pomatto
et al. (2020). Usually the main focus is on the cost of acquiring more / less precise information
about the payoff-relevant state, and its relationship with a single decision maker’s optimal choice.
The framework, however, has been applied in multi-player problem (i.e., in games), such as in
coordination games (Yang (2015); Morris and Yang (2021); Denti (2020). In particular, Denti
(2020) proposes a model of unrestricted information acquisition in games in which, as in our




There exist a principal and I ≥ 4 agents, and a finite set of payoff-relevant states Θ. Each
agent i’s payoff is denoted ui(d, θ), when a social decision d ∈ D is selected in state θ.10 For
example, in an auction, d may comprise a vector of each bidder i’s winning probability and
his expected payment, and ui is quasi-linear in the payment part. Later, his payoff net his
information acquisition cost is considered as his objective.
At the beginning, neither the principal nor any of the agents know θ, but they share a
common prior µ0 on Θ. In what follows, it is useful to imagine that there exists an unobservable
fundamental state of nature, x ∈ X, whereX is a measurable space associated with a probability
measure P. We assume X = [0, 1] with a Borel σ-algebra and x is uniformly distributed
on [0, 1].11 Taking a richer space of the fundamental state of nature does not change our
10We can endow the principal with his own payoff function u0(q, θ), though it is not necessary.
11See Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) who adapt this approach in the context of multi-sender Bayesian
persuasion.
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results. Then, we define θ as a measurable function of x, θ = θ(x). θ ∼ µ0 means that∫ 1
0
1{θ(x)=θ}dx = µ0(θ) for each θ ∈ Θ.
The agents can acquire costly information about θ by generating private and possibly cor-
related signals, whereas the principal cannot. More specifically, let Si be the set of possible
signals agent i may potentially obtain by any information acquisition technology. Potentially,
Si (in particular, its size) may be a part of i’s choice, but assuming exogenous Si simplifies our
analysis. Besides, as long as |Si| ≥ |Θ|, the same results obtain. i’s information acquisition
action is a measurable function σi : [0, 1] → Si, such that, once x (and hence θ = θ(x)) is
realized, then i observes si = σi(x). Let Σi denote the set of all such measurable functions,
defining i’s information acquisition action space. We assume that information acquisition is
fully private in the sense that neither the principal nor any other agent observes which action
i takes and which signal is realized. Agent i’s objective is the net payoff ui(d, θ) − ci(σi). We
assume the following property of the cost function:
Assumption 1. ci(σi) ≥ 0 for any σi ∈ Σi. ci(σi) = 0 if its induced si and θ are independently
distributed, that is, for each si ∈ Si and θ ∈ Θ:∫ 1
0








It is a quite general specification, which includes many popular cost functions as special
cases: entropy-based cost functions, more general posterior-separable cost functions, and even
some posterior-non-separable ones.12 However, it should be noted that we do not allow i’s
information acquisition cost to depend on others’ information acquisition actions. In other
words, the cost of information acquisition for each agent depends only on how much this agent
individually learns about θ, and not on how much other agents learn. We think it is a reasonable
choice, especially as a first-step approach, but it is a restriction, and our result hinges on it.13
12See the literature of cost of information, such as Sims (2003), Matejka and Mckay (2015), Caplin and Dean
(2015), and Pomatto et al. (2020).
13For example, Strulovici (2021) considers a situation where some hard information is scarce; Denti (2020)
considers a general interdependent information cost. As far as we know, there is no general consensus in the
literature which types of correlation structure should be more or less costly than others. Perhaps it depends on
specific contexts of interest. See also our discussion in the concluding section.
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Given any σ, a joint distribution for (θ, s) is determined, which we denote by α ∈ ∆(Θ×S).
If we want to make its dependence on σ more explicit, we denote it as ασ.
2.2 Mechanism
The principal faces both hidden action and hidden information of each agent. The principal
can commit to a mechanism at the ex ante stage in order to control the agents’ incentives. More
specifically, following the literature, we let the principal (i) send a message privately to each
agent before his information acquisition action, and (ii) collect a message privately from each
agent after observing a signal. Formally, a mechanism comprises (R, ρ;M, δ) where R = (Ri)
I
i=1
and M = (Mi)
I
i=1; Ri denotes the set of messages that the principal can send to each agent
i; Mi denotes the set of messages that each agent i can send to the principal; ρ ∈ ∆(R) is a
distribution over the principal’s messages, and δ : R×M → D denotes the decision rule.
The timing of the game is summarized as follows:
t = 0: x ∼ U(0, 1) is drawn (though no one observes it).
t = 1: The principal designs a mechanism (R, ρ;M, δ).
t = 2: After observing the mechanism and receiving ri ∈ Ri, each agent i privately chooses his
information acquisition action σi ∈ Σi.
t = 3: Each agent i privately observes si = σi(x), and privately sends mi ∈ Mi to the principal.
t = 4: The principal executes d = δ(r,m) where m = (mi)
I
i=1.
Because no agent observes the other agents’ actions or information (even noisily) at all, we
consider Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept. Then, applying the revelation principle
of Forges (1986), we focus on direct mechanisms where (i) the principal directly recommends
an information-acquisition action to each agent, and each agent directly reports a signal to the
principal, and (ii) each agent finds it optimal to obey the recommended action and truthfully
report his signal.14
14The proof proceeds as follows. First, imagine an auxiliary game where there is no principal, but instead,
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Formally, a direct mechanism comprises ((σi)
I
i=1, δ), where the principal recommends σi ∈ Σi
privately to each agent i,15 and executes δ(s) ∈ D if the agents report s = (si)Ii=1 ∈ S. It is a
feasible direct mechanism if it satisfies the following constraints: for any σ′i ∈ Σi and τi : Si → Si,∑
θ,si,s−i
(ui(δ(si, s−i), θ)ασi,σ−i(θ, si, s−i))− ci(σi) ≥
∑
θ,si,s−i
(ui(δ(τi(si), s−i), θ)ασ′i,σ−i(θ, si, s−i))− ci(σ
′
i).
That is, each i must find it optimal to obey the recommended σi and report the realized si
truthfully.
Although the constraints are concisely summarized by the simple-looking inequalities above,
they can potentially be very complicated. First, changing σi affects the joint distribution α of
(θ, s) and the agent’s cost, but the way it affects α is somewhat limited because i cannot affect
−i’s information structure. In particular, the marginal distribution induced by α on (θ, s−i)
must not change at all. Second, an agent may potentially want to make a double deviation,
that is, changing σi and at the same time changing his reporting strategy.
Remark 1. Here, we do not explicitly impose each agent’s individual rationality / participation
constraint. It is not difficult to accommodate this constraint: let us require that any feasible
direct mechanism must have an extra message ϕi (a “non-participation” message) so that i’s
message space is now Si ∪ {ϕi}, and δ(ϕi,m−i) is some specific allocation (a “non-participation
allocation”) for agent i, for any given m−i. Accordingly, the individual rationality constraints,
both at the ex ante and ex interim stages are captured as a part of the above incentive compati-
bility constraints.16
there is a fictitious player (“player 0”) who is indifferent across all decisions in any state. At first, each agent i
plays σi privately, and then observes the realized signal si privately. Then, (without any communication), player
0 chooses d ∈ D. Interpreting this as a baseline extensive-form game, it is easy to see that our current game
(with the principal) is the mediated communication game of this auxiliary game in the sense of Forges (1986)
(see also Myerson (1986)). Thus, her revelation principle applies.
15Here, we focus on a deterministic recommendation of σ, rather than any stochastic recommendation. Accord-
ingly, δ is denoted simply by δ(s) instead of δ(r, s). Our results do not change with stochastic recommendations.
16Ex interim individual rationality is guaranteed because agent i can always deviate to τi(·) ≡ ϕi. Ex ante
individual rationality is guaranteed because agent i can always deviate to a costless σi and then to τi(·) ≡ ϕi.
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3 Main result
Fix any function d∗ : Θ → D, which describes all the economically relevant outcomes in this
environment except for the information acquisition costs. If the principal could observe θ, then
any d∗ is attainable without any information acquisition cost on the agents’ side. In this sense,
one may interpret this d∗ together with zero cost as the first-best outcome.17
In this section, for any given d∗, we explicitly construct a mechanism that implements d∗
with zero cost. That is, the first-best outcome is indeed attainable, even though the principal
cannot directly observe θ.
Theorem 1. Fix any d∗ : Θ → D. Under Assumption 1, there exists a mechanism (σ, δ) such
that (i)
∑
s α(θ, s)1{δ(s)=d∗(θ)} = µ0(θ) for all θ, and (ii) ci(σi) = 0 for all i.
Proof. Our construction directly builds on Zhu (2021):
Lemma 1. (Zhu (2021); Lemma 2)18 Fix any M,N ∈ N and any random variable with finite
support, τ0 ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}. There exists τ1, . . . , τN such that (i) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(τ0, τi) are pairwise independent, and (ii) for any i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , N} with i ̸= j, τ0|(τi, τj) and
τk|(τi, τj) are degenerate.
In our context, let τ0 = θ and si = τi, and let σi ∈ Σi be the one that induces si. Then, the
first property says that θ, si are pairwise independent, implying ci(σi) = 0. The second property
says that, given si, sj with i ̸= j, we can fully identify θ and any sk without error, that is, there
exist θ(si, sj) and sk(si, sj) such that:
Pr(θ = θ(si, sj)|si, sj) = Pr(sk = sk(si, sj)|si, sj) = 1.
See Zhu (2021) for the detailed construction and proof.
Let the principal recommend the above σ, and offer the decision rule δ as follows: δ(s) = d∗(θ)
if (i) for any i, j with i ̸= j, we have
θ = θ(si, sj);
17For example, one may imagine the principal’s own preference and define d∗(θ) as his best decision given θ.
18Zhu (2021) calls the combination of these properties individually uninformative but aggregately revealing.
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or if (ii) there is i such that, for any j, k where i, j, k are all different, we have
θ = θ(sj, sk).
In any other case, δ(s) is arbitrary.
Clearly, if the agents obey the recommendation and report their signals truthfully, then the
first-best outcome is attained. Therefore, we complete the proof by showing that it satisfies
incentive compatibility. Take any agent i, and suppose that he deviates to any σ′i and report
τi(si) if each si is realized. First, his cost of information acquisition increases weakly. Second,
his reporting decision does not affect the social decision at all, because the principal executes
δ(s) = d∗(θ(sj, sk)) for an arbitrary pair (j, k) which does not include i. Therefore, it is incentive
compatible.
4 Applications
4.1 Full-surplus extraction in common value auctions
Consider the following common value auction environment. The seller (principal) has a
single indivisible good, and there are I ≥ 4 bidders. The value of the good is common to all
the bidders, denoted by θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is finite. In fact, the analysis of this section can be
straightforwardly extended to the case of “non-pure” common values where each i’s valuation
is vi(θ). Let µ0(θ) denote the probability that θ is the bidders’ common value.
Each bidder i’s payoff is θqi − ti − ci(σi) if he wins the good with probability qi, pays ti to
the seller, and spends ci(σi) as his information acquisition cost. In case he does not participate
in the mechanism, his outside-option payoff is 0. The seller’s payoff is revenue,
∑I
i=1 ti.
The first-best expected surplus of this society is the expected common value:∑
θ∈Θ
µ0(θ)θ = E[θ].
There are several cases where the seller can easily earn E[θ]. First, if the seller knows θ, then
he can simply post price θ. Even if the seller does not know θ, if the bidders know θ as their
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common knowledge (i.e., as free information), then again the seller can earn E[θ]. Conversely,
if all the bidders are completely uninformed (so that each only knows the common prior µ0),
then again, the seller can post price E[θ].
Notice that, with costly information acquisition as considered in our paper, neither of the
above ideas would work. First, although it might be possible to make every bidder fully learn θ
in some equilibrium, it does not yield E[θ] as long as full information is strictly costly. Second,
if the seller posts price E[θ], then each bidder has a strong incentive of knowing whether the
true θ is below E[θ] or not: If i finds that E[θ|si] < E[θ] given some signal si, he would not
buy the good. As long as such information is not too costly, the bidder would be better off by
acquiring it.
Therefore, with a general information acquisition cost function, the equilibrium information
should be somewhere between full and no information, and it is a priori unclear how the seller
should find the optimal balance of information and rent extraction. Nevertheless, as long as
the cost functions satisfy Assumption 1, Theorem 1 implies that the full-surplus extraction is
possible.
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1, there is a mechanism which yields E[θ] as the seller’s
expected revenue (and each bidder earns 0).
It is worth emphasizing that the logic here is very different from that of Crémer and McLean
(1988). In their paper, the seller exploits an exogeneously given correlated signal structure, in
order to construct a side-bet scheme that extracts the entire surplus. In our case, each bidder
can choose any information structure. Indeed, if he prefers, a bidder can choose an information
structure such that his information is independent from all the other bidders’ signals. The
Crémer-McLean lottery scheme, therefore, does not work here. Also, in their mechanism, each
bidder’s payoff can be strictly negative ex post, while in our case, it is zero ex post. Indeed, if
a mechanism offers a negative ex post payoff in our environment, a bidder would have a strong
incentive of getting a signal indicative of that event and then report differently, in order to avoid
such a negative payoff.
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4.2 First-best implementation in collective decision-making
Consider a committee with a designer (principal) and I ≥ 4 members (agents) deciding
whether to hire or not to hire a job market candidate. Formally, d ∈ D = {h, nh}. The quality
of the candidate is θ ∈ Θ, which is unobserved ex ante. The designer and all members of the
committee hold a common prior belief µ0 ∈ ∆(Θ) about the candidate’s quality.
The utility that each member obtains from hiring / not hiring the candidate is defined as
follows:
ui(d, θ) =
ui(θ), if d = h0, if d = nh
Without loss of generality, we assume that ui(θ) = kiθ.
Only the committee members can acquire information about the candidate at cost ci(σi).
The designer aims to maximize the expected sum of all members’ gross utilities.19 That is,
ideally, he wants to hire the candidate if and only if
∑
i kiθ ≥ 0. The first best expected surplus














It is useful to note that the existing literature (see e.g. Li (2001) and Gerardi and Yariv
(2008)) typically assumes that the committee members have access to information structures
whose realized signals are independently distributed across them, conditional on the state of
the world. Under these restrictions, the first best outcome cannot be implemented. There
are two main forces that prevent the committee from implementing the first best with these
restricted information structures: free-riding problem and conflict of interest. First, when
committee members have a conflict of interest, they may prefer not to report their own acquired
information truthfully. Second, even if all members share a common preference, information
could be underprovided relative to the social optimum, because it is essentially a public good
used to make a collective decision. For example, Li (2001) suggests that distorting the decision
19The result extends to the case where the designer maximizes expected sum of members’ net utilities (taking
into account the information acquisition costs).
12
rule away from the ex post optimal rule (which is optimal under exogenous information) could
help to alleviate the free-riding issue.
In contrast to the previous literature, our results show that with more flexible (even though
still costly) information acquisition the designer can implement the first best outcome. On
the one hand, having access to a wider range of information acquisition technologies enlarges
the set of feasible deviations for the agents. On the other hand, the principal now has more
flexibility in designing information structures recommended to the agents. Given these two
opposing effects, it is not immediately clear a priori whether the first best outcome becomes
more or less difficult to attain. It turns out that the second effect dominates: with a larger set
of feasible mechanisms, the principal is able to incentivize the agents to acquire and report their
information truthfully, no matter what social choice rule the principal is trying to implement.
Indeed, Theorem 1 implies that the first best is implementable as long as Assumption 1 about
the cost functions holds.




i kiθ ≥ 0]
as the total expected surplus (the decision is made under full information with no cost).
Our construction helps to resolve both of the issues that prevent first best implementation
with conditionally independent signals. Recall that it costs nothing for an agent to acquire
an “individually uninformative” signal which is assigned to him under the optimal mechanism.
Therefore, the distorted provision of information is resolved. Moreover, even if committee
members have a conflict of interest, under our mechanism, they cannot do better than being
truthful since any unilateral deviation can be detected by the designer.
5 Concluding remarks
It is quite natural that agents may desire to refine their information in response to the mech-
anism. This paper proposes one possible framework, based on “private-value” cost functions.
We show that such a specification leads to an extremely positive result. We conclude the paper
with two remarks.
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5.1 Interdependent cost functions
One natural criticism may be that our mechanism induces full information if the signals are
aggregated, even though any single signal is completely uninformative: would it be reasonable
to assume that such σi is costless? Because the answer is necessarily yes under Assumption 1,
the question is essentially whether Assumption 1 itself is reasonable.
As far as we are aware of, there is no clear consensus nor guidance as to what kinds of
correlation structures of the signals are more or less expensive to each agent. There seem
to be cases where more positive correlation is more expensive. For example, fix agent 1’s
private information, and consider agent 2. If acquiring a positively correlated information
necessarily means that agent 2 must steal (perhaps a part of) agent 1’s information, more
positive correlation would be more costly. There are, however, opposite situations. Strulovici
(2021), for example, considers the environment where hard evidence is scarce in the sense that,
if one agent “picks up” a piece of evidence, then it becomes difficult for the others to get the
same or similar evidence. There also seem to be cases where less correlated signals are more
costly: for example, imagine that there exist 2 newspapers, and σi corresponds to the decision
of which newspapers to buy (including the options of buying both or none). Assume that the
information in those newspapers is highly positively correlated, and assume that agent 1 buys
(only) newspaper 1 for sure. In this case, agent 2 receives a positively correlated signal regardless
of the newspaper he chooses, while in order to obtain something less correlated, he must buy
both newspapers and orthogonalize newspaper 2’s information from newspaper 1’s information.
Thus, less correlation is more costly.
This discussion suggests that we must be more specific about the microstructure of the infor-
mation sources, in order to determine which correlation structures are more costly. Mechanism
design with such more specific information acquisition cost structures would certainly be an
interesting future direction, and we hope this article could serve as a first step towards that
direction.
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5.2 Two or three agents
Obviously, the individually-uninformative-but-aggregately-revealing signal structures require
four or more agents. With three agents, although it is possible to determine whether some agent
has unilaterally deviated or not, but it is not possible to identify who is the deviator (and hence
to identify the true θ). If there exists d ∈ D that can serve as a severe punishment for all agents
for any given θ, then the same result obtains. See Zhu (2021) too.
With two agents, then each agent has much more freedom. Indeed, the authors work on
a separate project with two agents. There, even under Assumption 1, an extremely positive
result similar to the one obtained in this paper does not generally hold. The optimal mechanism
typically involves some costly information acquisition, and hence, the specification of the cost
functions matters even more.
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